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In this paper we study how the introduction of the euro has affected corporate 
financing in Europe. We use firm-level data from eleven euro area countries as 
well as from a control group of five other European countries spanning the years 
1991–2006. We show that firms from euro area countries that previously had 
weak currencies have increased both their equity and their debt financing 
compared to the control group. We also show that results are stronger for firms 
that hail from less financially developed euro area countries, and that large firms 
from industries that are dependent on external financing have increased their debt 
financing more. These results support the hypothesis that improved access to 
capital markets in the euro area has enabled increased external financing, 
especially debt financing. 
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Tässä työssä tutkitaan, kuinka euro on vaikuttanut yritysten rahoitukseen Euroo-
passa. Tutkimuksessa käytetään yritysdataa yhdestätoista euromaasta. 
Kontrolliryhmänä viidestä muusta Euroopan maasta. Data kattaa vuodet 
1991−2006. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että heikkojen valuuttojen euromaista tu-
levat yritykset ovat lisänneet sekä osake- että velkarahoitustaan kontrolliryhmään 
verrattuna. Tulos vahvistuu silloin, kun yritykset tulevat euromaista, joissa 
rahoitusmarkkinat ovat olleet kehittymättömiä. Lisäksi suuryritykset, joiden 
teollisuusala on erityisen riippuvainen ulkoisesta rahoituksesta, ovat kasvattaneet 
velkarahoitustaan muita enemmän. Tulokset tukevat hypoteesia, jonka mukaan 
rahoituksen tarjonnan kasvu on lisännyt yritysten ulkoista rahoitusta, erityisesti 
velkarahoitusta. 
 
Avainsanat: euro, ulkoinen rahoitus, rahoituksen tarjonta, rahoitusmarkkinoiden 
kehittyneisyys, riippuvuus rahoituksesta, rahoitusmarkkinoiden integraatio 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The introduction of the euro as the common currency in Europe in 1999 was a 
monumental event whose economic and financial effects are widely debated. We aim to 
participate in this debate by examining if the euro has affected corporate financing choices in 
Europe. In particular, our objective is to study if the euro has increased the use of external 
financing for companies hailing from the euro-area compared to other European companies. 
The use of external financing may increase if the demand for financing has increased, or 
if the supply of financing has improved. Previous research by Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006, 
2009) show that the introduction of the euro resulted in increases in corporate valuations and 
investments for euro-area firms compared to other European firms. Corporate valuations 
increased because the cost of capital – both for debt and equity – decreased in euro-area 
compared to the countries that didn’t adopt the euro as their currency. The decrease in cost of 
capital has then led to an increase in corporate investments. As a result of increased valuations 
and investments, it is reasonable to expect that the demand for external financing has increased 
in the euro-area compared to the countries that decided to stay out.  
If there are no frictions in financial markets, companies are free to choose their amount of 
debt and equity financing given the prevailing market prices. However, this may not always be 
the case. Sometimes companies are not able to raise external financing even if they have 
profitable investment opportunities. In other words, companies may face financing constraints. 
After the introduction of the euro, issuing bonds has become a viable alternative to borrowing 
from banks, especially for large corporations. Thus the euro may have helped to alleviate 
financing constraints and increased external financing in that way.  Interestingly, the size of the 
euro-area corporate bond markets has increased significantly, while bond markets elsewhere in  
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Europe have not grown correspondingly (see, e.g. Rajan and Zingales (2003), Pagano and von 
Thadden (2004), Lane (2008)). It is also possible that companies from outside of the euro area 
could take advantage of the expanded euro-denominated bond markets. If this were the case, then 
euro-area companies should not raise more debt financing compared to other European 
companies, controlling for factors that affect the demand for financing. However, we argue that 
non-euro firms may face additional international financing constraints when they are 
contemplating raising euro-denominated debt. For example firms coming from outside the euro-
area could face constraints due to their limited amount of revenues denominated in euros. 
Consequently, non-euro firms may find it harder to issue euro-denominated bonds (for 
international financing constraints, see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001)). 
 The core of our empirical analysis consists of estimating regressions where the change in 
external financing, the change in debt or the change in external equity, all normalized by lagged 
assets, are the dependent variables. As explanatory variables we use measures of size, 
profitability, collateral together with Tobin's Q, and time dummies for firms in the euro area for 
the time the common currency has been in use. Because Tobin's Q is endogenous (as shown by 
Bris et al., 2009), we use the corresponding U.S. industry Q as an explanatory variable instead of 
the firm’s own Q.  
Our sample consists of 2,486 firms from 16 European countries in the period 1991-2006. 
In particular, we use corporate-level data from the eleven original countries that adopted the euro 
in 1999. As our control sample we use the three EU countries that did not adopt the euro - 
Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K. - as well as Norway and Switzerland. Using a control sample 
allows us to compute differences-in-differences estimators to measure the impact of the euro 
both cross-sectionally and in the time-series domain.  
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We show that the introduction of the euro has lead to 4.0 percent yearly increase in 
external financing for companies from the euro-area, compared to companies from our control 
countries. The annual increase is 2 percent both for debt and external equity financing.  When we 
split the sample of euro firms between firms in weak-euro countries - countries that suffered a 
currency crisis in the years before the introduction of the euro - and strong-euro countries, we 
find that for the weak euro-countries the annual increase in external financing is 7.7 percent, 
composed of 5.1 increase in debt financing and 2.6 percent increase in external equity financing.  
For strong-euro countries the increase in external financing is 2.4 percent per year, consisting 
mainly of an annual increase in external equity financing (1.8 percent).   
This increase in external financing can either be attributed to increase in demand for 
financing or increase in supply. The results showing that firms from weak-euro countries have 
raised more external financing than firms from strong-euro countries is consistent with the 
explanation that demand for financing has increased, since Bris et al (2006, 2009) show that the 
weak-euro firms experienced higher increases in Q and in investment levels after the 
introduction of the euro. We also show that external financing has increased more after 2002, 
even though increase in valuations were highest in 1999 (Bris et al. 2009). If demand for 
financing were the sole factor contributing for greater use for external financing, firms would 
have raised more financing already in 1999-2002. 
Thus explanations based on increased supply of financing are also plausible. We provide 
support for the supply channel by showing that the countries that were least financially 
developed measured by the size of their private bond markets before the introduction of the euro 
show the largest increases in external financing, especially in debt financing. This result, 
however, is conclusive evidence neither for increased demand for financing nor for increased  
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supply of financing, since the countries that tended to have weak currencies also had less 
developed financial markets.  
To further examine if supply of financing is a major contributing factor for the increase in 
external financing in the euro-area, we classify industries to be dependent on external financing 
by measuring fraction of investments financed by external finance in corresponding industries in 
the U.S. between 1991 and 1997 (following the procedure of Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We then 
show that industries that are dependent on external financing have significantly increased their 
debt and equity financing compared to the control group after the introduction of the euro. The 
result holds for all euro-firms, but it is much stronger for firms from weak-euro countries (annual 
increase is 7.1 percent in debt financing and 3.3 percent in equity financing). We further examine 
the role of financial dependence by studying the interaction of size and financial dependence. We 
show that large firms that are dependent on external financing have increased debt financing 
more than other firms. This is a clear indication that the increased supply of financing has had a 
major impact on corporate financing in euro-countries, since we would have expected the effects 
to be larger for small firms, if the demand for financing were the only factor affecting financing 
decisions
1. 
We also study how foreign sales affect external financing. Bris et al. (2009) show that 
companies that had negative exposure to currency depreciations experienced largest increases in 
valuations after the introduction of the euro. Those companies would typically have no or very 
little foreign sales. As expected, we show that companies with low foreign sales increase their 
debt financing the most. This result as such is consistent with increased demand for financing 
                                                 
1 Bris et al. (2009) show that valuations increased more for small firms in the euro-area. This implies that small 
firms should have increased their use of external financing more.  
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hypothesis. However, we also interact foreign sales with size, and show that once again effects 
are stronger for large corporations. This implies that the supply channel is also important. 
Finally, we confirm that increased external financing has consequently led to asset 
growth. External financing has been used to increase non-cash assets. Interestingly, cash 
holdings or dividends have not grown compared to non-euro firms. Firms that belong to 
industries that are more dependent on external financing have experienced higher growth in non-
cash assets. Better access to financing has thus had real consequences. Consistent with the 
external financing results, the growth in non-cash assets has been faster during after 2002. Even 
though valuations increased immediately when euro was introduced, it seems to have taken some 
time before the institutional framework was ready to support increased firm growth. 
 As a summary, we provide evidence that the introduction of the euro has led to increase 
in external financing, especially for debt financing, among the euro-countries. Results are 
stronger for firm from those countries that previously had weak currencies and for firms that 
have the lowest foreign sales, supporting the hypothesis that increased external financing is due 
to stronger demand for financing. However, there is clear evidence that increased supply has 
been also a major contributing factor. Large firms, who supposedly have better access to 
syndicated loans and bond markets, have increased their debt financing more. Industries that are 
more dependent on external financing have increased their debt financing more. These findings 
support the hypothesis that the increased supply of financing has led to increased use of external 
financing among the euro-countries. 
Next section reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the developments in European 
financial markets, the data sources, and the variables used in the paper. Section 4 discusses the 
methods and main results. Section 5 examines the role of financial development.  Section 6  
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studies how dependence on external financing affects financing. Section 7 examines foreign 
sales and financing. Section 8 focuses on asset growth and Section 9 concludes.   
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
There is a growing literature on euro and deepening financial integration it has fostered
2. 
Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and Priestley (2006) show that excess stock returns in the euro area 
have become more sensitive to common euro risk at the expense of country-specific risks
3. As 
Stulz (1999) has pointed out, if the country-specific risk larger than the common euro-risk, 
financial integration should led to a decrease in the risk premium required by investors, and 
hence the cost of equity. Supporting evidence is provided by Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and 
Priestley (2007), who find evidence that the cost of equity has decreased in the euro area since 
the introduction of the euro, and that there is no similar reduction in cost of capital for those EU 
countries that that chose not to adopt the euro as their currency.  Hassan (2010) shows that the 
cost of equity has decreased in euro-area for the non-tradable sector. Bris et al. (2009) find 
consistent evidence for cost of equity reduction using Tobin’s Q-ratios: valuations measured 
using Q-rations have increased after the introduction of the euro, especially for countries that 
devalued their currencies during the EMS-crisis of 1992-93. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 
Siegel (2010) find no evidence that the euro has led to a decrease in valuation differentials for 
euro-countries compared to non-euro countries, but they show that there is a strong European 
                                                 
2 For two recent comprehensive overviews on European financial integration, see Lane (2008), and Japelli and 
Pagano (2008). For overview of the macroeconomic effects of the euro, see Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010). 
3 Cappiello, Kadareja, and Manganelli (2009) show that comovements between European stock market returns have 
increased since 1999, implying increased stock market integration.    
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Union effect: bilateral valuation differentials are significantly lower for EU members than for 
non-members. 
In addition, Bartram and Karolyi (2006) show that due to the introduction of the euro, the 
market risk has been significantly reduced implying that currency risks have been a major non-
diversifiable risk in Europe prior to the euro. Hassan (2010) shows that real interest rates have 
declined in the euro-area, because bonds denominated in euro provide better insurance against 
consumption shocks than bonds issued in the legacy currencies would have provided. Corporate 
bond markets have also become more integrated and credit spreads have converged across the 
euro-area. Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004) show that since the adoption 
of the euro, the impact of country-factors in explaining credit spreads has become economically 
small and that credit spreads are more influenced by fundamental factors like ratings and 
maturity.  
  Transactions costs for buying euro-area assets have declined significantly since the 
introduction of the euro. Coeurdacier and Martin (2008) provide evidence that for all investors – 
no matter where they originate from – the costs for buying euro-area bonds and stocks have 
decreased by 14% and 17%, respectively. Inside the euro-area transactions costs have become 
lower by additional 10-17%.  Lower transactions costs, in addition to the elimination of 
exchange rate risk within the euro area and currency matching rules for assets and liabilities 
becoming irrelevant within euro area, have resulted in dramatic increase in cross-border portfolio 
investments between euro-countries. The increase is portfolio investments is more pronounced 
for bonds ((Lane (2006), De Santis and Gerard (2006)), but cross-border holdings within euro-
area have also increased significantly for equities (De Santis and Gerard (2006), Lane and   
Milesi-Ferretti (2007)). Bilateral bank holdings have also increased between euro-countries by  
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25-30% compared to other EU members, because of the elimination of currency risk within the 
euro-area (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010)). 
 Euro-denominated  corporate  bond issuance activity has also increased significantly after 
the introduction of the euro (Rajan and Zingales (2003), Pagano and von Thadden (2004)). Right 
after the introduction of the euro non-financial corporations were the main issuers of bonds, but 
later on financial institutions have been responsible for the bulk of the issues. In international 
markets the increase in euro-denominated bond issues has at least partially been at the expense of 
dollar denominated bonds (Hale and Spiegel (2009)).  
  There is an emerging literature how changes in the supply of financing affect firms’ 
financing choices. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) compare firms that have bond ratings – and 
thus access to bond markets – to firms that do not. They show that firms with bond ratings have 
35% more debt in their capital structures, even after controlling for firm characteristics that 
typically explain firms’ capital structure choices. Other recent papers that study the changes in 
the supply of financing are Leary (2009), Sufi (2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010). Leary 
finds that the emergence of market for certificate of deposits in 1961 and the resulting expansion 
in bank credit led to increased leverage for firms. Sufi shows that the introduction of syndicated 
loan ratings in 1995 led to increased borrowing by firms that obtained a rating. Lemmon and 
Roberts study the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the resultant decrease in high-yield 
bond financing and show that this resulted in decrease in financing and investments for those 
firms that were using high-yield debt financing. All these papers thus confirm empirically that 
the supply of financing matters and that corporate financing choices are not only determined by 
demand factors.  Like Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Lemmon and Roberts (2010) we 
show that even large corporations may face financing constraints and that access to bond markets  
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is a significant determinant in firms’ financing choices. To our knowledge, our paper is the first 
one using international evidence to demonstrate that. 
 
3.  Financial Market Developments and Data Description 
 
3.1.  Financial Market Developments 
The most significant change in euro-area financial markets since the introduction of the 
euro has been the growth of the corporate bond market.  Figure 1 shows the outstanding stock of 
domestic debt securities issued by non-financial corporations measured in billions of US dollars 
(panel A) and as indexed values where 1998 (the last year prior to the euro) is given the values of 
100 (panel B). According to Bank of International Settlements definitions, domestic securities 
are issued in domestic currency and targeted to domestic investors. All other securities are 
international securities. Prior to the introduction of the euro, the outstanding stock of domestic 
debt securities issued by corporations was about 200 billion USD for euro-countries. The 
outstanding stock started to grow rapidly after the common currency was introduced and the 
stock was 1.2 trillion dollars by the year 2006. Since the introduction of the euro, the size of the 
market has increased by 400%. The growth has been especially drastic for Germany. The 
outstanding stock for Germany was only 8.8 billion USD in 1998, but the stock exploded to 143 
billion USD by 2006. Interestingly, there is basically no growth in domestic debt issuance for 
non-euro corporations, the stock has remained around 100 billion USD. The outstanding stock 
has even declined for the UK: in 1998 it was 31.8 billion USD, but in 2006 only 23.1 billion 
USD.    
Figure 2 presents the evolution for international debt securities. Before the introduction of 
the euro, the US dollar was by far the most important currency for non-financial corporations in  
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international bond markets. About 2/3 of the total issue volume was denominated in US dollars 
(Gale and Spiegel, 2009). After 199 the euro became the most important currency for issuing 
bonds for non-financial corporations. Approximately 45% of the total issue volume has been 
denominated in euros since the introduction of the euro. In panel A we can see that stock of 
international debt securities was about 130 billion USD in 1998 for euro firms and 115 billion 
USD for non-euro firms. After that euro-firms begun to issue considerably more international 
debt securities reaching 562 billion USD in 2006. Non-euro firms also started to issue more 
international debt securities, but the growth rate was more modest. The stock for non-euro firms 
was 313 billion USD in 2006. From panel B we can see that the outstanding stock for 
international corporate issues grew by 330% for euro-firms and by 169% for non-euro firms 
from 1998 to 2006. Figure 3 presents the evolution of international syndicated credit facilities. 
The difference between euro- and non-euro countries has once again been significant. Since 2003 
the growth was especially fast for euro-country syndicated loans.  
 
3.2.  Sample 
The sample of firms used in this study is gathered from Worldscope and covers the 
period 1991- 2006.  The sample includes firms from the eleven countries that first adopted the 
euro at its introduction in January 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Our comparison sample of firms is 
drawn from three EU, non-euro countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) as well as from 
Norway and Switzerland. We consider these five non-euro countries to constitute appropriate 
benchmark countries for an analysis of the impact of the euro on firms’ financing activities. 
Denmark, Sweden, and the UK all opted out from joining EMU at the outset. Norway and 
Switzerland obviously cannot join EMU as non-EU countries, but at the same time they are  
17 
 
tightly integrated with the EU in many areas relevant to business thanks to geographical 
proximity and follow EU regulations because of the European Economic Area –agreement.
4 
As is standard in corporate finance research, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999). We also exclude firm-year observations missing any data in Worldscope needed to 
construct our outcome variables or full set of firm-level control variables. Furthermore, we 
exclude firm-year observations with zero sales or negative book values.   Finally we require that 
the remaining firms appear in the sample for at least one year during 1991-1997 and at least one 
year during 1999-2006.  This last requirement ensures that firms exist both before and after the 
introduction of the euro in January 1999. Firms that appear only in 1998 in the pre-euro period 
are excluded because by then it was clear that the euro would come to fruition, and that fact 
could have been a factor behind firms’ decision to go public at the time. Because we do not 
require that the firms exist for the whole sample period of 1991-2006, we end up with an 
unbalanced panel of firms.  
Our final sample consists of 2,486 firms (29,332 firm-year observations): 1,348 firms 
(16,098 firm-year observations) from the euro countries and 1,138 firms (13,834 firm-year 
observations) from the non-euro countries. Germany and France together contribute more than 
half of the firms to the euro sample (742 firms; 8,753 firm-year observations); whereas the UK 
dominates the non-euro sample with 696 firms (8,523 firm-year observations). Although firms 
Germany, France and the UK make up a majority of the sample, our results are robust to 
excluding these observations.   
                                                 
4 Greece was a non-euro, EU member at the time of the initial introduction of the euro and was actively looking to 
adopt the euro. However, because Greece did not fulfill the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty, the country 
did not officially adopt the euro until January 2001. We exclude Greece from the main analysis because it is difficult 
classifying Greece as either a non-euro or euro country in 1999 and 2000. We also exclude the new euro-members – 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia – for the same reason and also for the reason that for these countries there are 




3.3.  Variables 
Appendix A lists the full technical definitions of the variables used in this study and 
Appendix B presents summary statistics.  
To capture firms financing activities we construct three different variables: Net Debt 
Issues, Net Equity Issues, and Net External Finance. Net Debt Issues is defined as the net change 
in the book value of total liabilities over a given year divided by the lagged book value of assets. 
Similarly, Net Equity Issues is defined as the net change in external equity divided by the lagged 
book value of assets.  Depending on data availability, we calculate the net change in external 
equity any given year either as (i) reported proceeds from sales of common and preferred stock 
minus purchases and retirements of common and preferred stock, or as (ii) the change in the 
book value of common and preferred stock minus the change in retained earnings. Finally we 
define Net External Finance as the sum of Net Debt Issues and Net Equity Issues. Because the 
net debt and equity issues variables are expressed as fractions of the past period’s assets, Net 
External Finance captures the net contribution of all external financing activities to asset growth. 
We winsorize the financing variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
extremely fast growing or shrinking firms (mainly caused by M&As and divestitures). Panel A 
of Appendix B show that over the entire time period we study, non-euro firms on average raise 
more external capital per year than euro firms (8.8% of previous year’s assets vs. 7.5%). The 
larger external financing activity is due to larger debt issues as well as larger equity issues.   
Regarding other firm characteristics used in this study,  Panel A of Appendix B shows 
that euro firms on average have greater leverage (including more than twice as many 
observations with leverage over 90%), larger  sales, lower growth opportunities (as measured by  
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median industry Q for corresponding US firms) , less collateral value, and somewhat greater 
profitability (EBITDA/assets).  
Turning to some country characteristics, Panel B of Appendix B shows that euro 
countries on average grew faster during this time period than non-euro countries, although this is 
mainly due to Ireland. It is also notable that financial markets in the euro countries were on 
average relatively smaller than those in the non-euro countries. This is true regardless if we 
measure financial development by the outstanding value of private bond markets, the market 
capitalization of the stock market, or by the amount of private credit by banks and other financial 
institutions.  
 
4.  The Euro and External Financing: Main Results 
 
4.1.  Empirical Methodology 
To analyze the impact of the formation of the euro on firm’s external financing activities, 
we employ a standard difference-in-difference methodology. That is , we estimate the impact of 
the euro by comparing differences in financing activities before and after the euro for the firms in 
the euro countries and compare these differences with the comparable differences for a sample of 
firms from non-euro countries. More formally, for our sample in which firm i is observed 
annually at year t, we estimate the effect of the euro on financing variable y in OLS regressions 
of the following kind: 
yit  = αi + θt + β Xit + δ EUROit  + εit,        (1) 
where αi  is the fixed firm effect for firm i,  θt  is the fixed time effect for year t, Xit is a vector of 
time-varying control variables,  EUROit is a dummy variable  indicating whether or not the euro  
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was adopted by firm i’s country at time t, and  εit,is the residual. To control for serial dependence 
within a country, we estimate standard errors robust to clustering at the country level.  
The fixed firm effects control for any unobserved constant factors that may influence 
firms’ financing choices (this includes constant industry and country factors). The fixed time 
effects control for time trends common for both euro and non-euro firms. Because of the 
inclusion of these time dummies, the coefficient δ is the difference-in-difference estimator of the 
impact of the euro.  
The dummy variable EURO in equation (1) is equal to 1 if the year is 1999 or later and 
the firm belongs to a country that adopted the euro, otherwise it is 0. As an alternative 
specification, we replace EURO with two dummies indicating firms in strong and weak euro 
countries, respectively, in the post-euro period. The weak euro countries are the euro countries 
that had to abandon their pegged exchange rates or devalue their currencies during the ERM 
crisis of 1992-93. We make the distinction between strong and weak euro countries since Bris et 
al (2006, 2009) show that the weak euro firms experienced higher increases in valuation and in 
investment levels after the introduction of the euro. They attributed these results to a removal of 
devaluation risk and resulting decrease in cost of capital. An alternative justification for 
classifying euro countries into weak and strong is that the classification may be a proxy for 
international financing constraints. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) argue that firms may 
face two kinds of collateral constraints in borrowing: domestic and international constraints. 
Because of a history of devaluations, weak euro countries may face more stringent international 




4.2.  Univariate Results 
Before turning to our regression analysis, we first present some univariate difference-in-
difference results in Table I. For each of our three financing variables, we calculate an average 
for the pre-euro period and the post-euro period separately. We then calculate the difference 
between the post-euro and the pre-euro averages, which gives us a firm specific difference in 
means. The pre-and post euro individual firm averages as well as within-firm differences are 
then averaged across all firms in the euro countries and non-euro countries, respectively.  
Panel A of Table I Table show that euro firms on average increase their yearly net 
external financing, expressed as a fraction of last year’s assets, with 0.005 following the 
introduction of the euro. By contrast, non-euro firms’ change in Net External Finance is - 0.055.  
The increase for euro firms is not statistically significant by itself, but the decline for non-euro 
firms and the difference-in-difference between euro and non-euro firms are both strongly 
statistically significant (at the 1%-level) according to t-tests. Looking at strong versus weak euro 
firms, we see that strong euro firms on average actually decrease their yearly external financing 
by -0.009 (not significant) whereas weak euro firms increase theirs by 0.041 (significant at 1%-
level). However, the difference-in-difference between strong euro firms is still significant (at 
1%-level). The difference-in-difference between weak and strong euro firms is also significant 
(at 5%- level). 
Panels B and C show that the above pattern is repeated for Net Debt Issues and Net 
Equity Issues. Non-euro firms significantly decrease both debt and equity issues on average, 
whereas there is an (insignificant) increase in both for euro firms overall. The difference-in-
difference between non-euro and euro firms is significant for both debt and equity issues.  For 
weak vs. strong euro firms, we see that strong euro firms decrease their debt issues in absolute  
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terms, although their decrease is significantly less than the decrease for non-euro firms. By 
contrast weak euro firms significantly increase their debt issues. For equity issues there does not 
seem to be any difference between strong and weak euro firms; both groups register a marginal 
(insignificant) increase, and the change for both groups is significantly different from the change 
for non-euro-firms. 
Overall, the univariate difference-in-difference evidence suggests that the euro has 
enabled euro firms to increase their external financing relative to non-euro firms. This seems to 
be particularly true for weak euro firms, who increase their financing also in absolute terms and 
not just relative to non-euro firms.   
 
4.3.  Main Results 
We next estimate the regression outlined in Eq. (1) above. We run two different 
specifications of the regression model for each of three dependent variables  (Net External 
Finance, Net Debt Issues, and Net Equity Issues) ; one with one single euro dummy, and one 
with different euro dummies for strong euro firms and weak euro firms, respectively. As control 
variables we use five different firm characteristics, all of which are lagged one year relative to 
our outcome variables: US Industry Q,  Log(sales), EBITDA/Assets,  Collateral/Assets, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether leverage (expressed as total liabilities/assets) is above 90% [ 
I(Leverage>90%)]. US Industry Q is our proxy for a firm’s investment opportunities and is the 
median Q of US firms in the same two digit SIC code and year. We do not use firms’ individual 
Q ratios because Bris et al (2009) show that they are affected by the introduction of the euro and 
are therefore endogenous in this setting.  Log(sales) is our proxy for firm size and is calculated 
using sales in real USD.  EBITDA/Assets is a measure of a firms operating profitability, and  
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Collateral/Assets is meant to capture the debt capacity of tangible assets.  Versions of these four 
variables have previously been used by, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) to explain firm’s debt 
choices. We also add  I(Leverage>90%) as control variable based on the idea that firms with 
extreme leverage ratios have exhausted their debt capacity and are more or less forced to issue 
equity when they raise external capital.  
We also add three country characteristics as control variables: GDP Growth,  Term 
Spread, and Change in USD Exchange rate.  GDP Growth (the real GDP growth rate) is 
included to capture differences in contemporaneous business cycles across countries and Term 
Spread (the 10-year government bond rate minus the 6-month t-bill rate) is included because it 
captures expectations of future growth and inflation, which can affect firms current financing 
decisions. Both of these variables are lagged one year relative to the outcome variables.   Change 
in USD Exchange rate, defined as the percentage change in the domestic currency/USD 
exchange rate from the end of the previous year to the end of the current year, is included 
because the firm level accounting variables that form the basis for our outcome variables are 
measured in USD and we want to make sure that we capture actual firm decisions and not just 
differences in dollar value fluctuations across currencies.  
Table II presents the main estimation results. We see that the introduction of the euro has 
lead to a statistically significant annual increase in external financing equal to 4.0 % of 
beginning-of-year assets for companies from the euro-area compared to companies from our 
control countries. The annual increase is 2% both for debt and external equity financing 
(significant at the 10% and 1%-levels, respectively).  When we split the sample of euro firms 
between firms in weak-euro and strong-euro countries, we find that for the weak euro-countries 
the annual increase in external financing is 7.7% (significant at the 1%- level), composed of a 5.1  
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%  increase in debt financing and 2.6 percent increase in external equity financing (both effects 
significant at the 1%-level).  For strong-euro countries there is an increase in external financing 
is 2.4 percent per year, which is mainly due to a significant annual increase in external equity 
financing (1.8 percent). There is no significant effect of the euro on debt financing for strong 
euro firms.  The larger increases in total external financing, as well as the larger increase in debt 
and equity issues for weak euro firms versus strong euro firms are all statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
The increase in external financing can either be attributed to increase in demand for 
financing or increase in supply. The results showing that firms from weak-euro countries have 
raised more external financing than firms from strong-euro countries is consistent with the 
explanation that demand for financing has increased, since Bris et al (2006, 2009) show that the 
weak-euro firms experienced higher increases in Q and in investment levels after the 
introduction of the euro. In Table III we further test this by splitting the post-euro time period 
into one earlier period 1999-2002- and one later period (2003-2006).  If euro firms only increase 
external financing as a response to the beneficial impact of euro on demand factors - lower cost 
of capital and increased investment opportunities - we would expect a relatively immediate 
increase in external financing because such positive demand shocks have been immediately 
recognized by financial markets and incorporated in company valuations immediately when the 
euro was introduced (see Bris et al. (2009)).  On the other hand, it takes a longer time for the 
institutions of financial markets to change and thus for supply factors to have an impact on 
financing decisions. Table III shows that the net external financing, net debt issues or net equity 
issues did not increase for euro-countries right after the introduction of the euro, as we would 
have expected if the demand for financing were the only factor influencing the financing  
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decisions. Rather, the increase in external financing happens during the years 2003-2006, 
supporting the hypothesis that changing financial institutions and resulting increase in the supply 
of financing were the main drivers. 
In tables II and III we classified firms as weak or strong euro firms. The results in those 
tables could be due to the fact that firms from France, Germany, and the UK dominate the 
sample. In order to make sure that few large countries do not determine the results we present 
results by individual countries in Table IV. We use the UK as the benchmark, so all the results 
are relative to the UK results. The results are what we expect them to be. Firms from weak euro 
countries have increased both their debt and equity financing. The only exception is Ireland, 
where only debt financing has increased significantly. The Irish results are consistent with the 
findings of Bris et al (2009), who show that Ireland didn’t experince any increase in corporate 
valuations after the introduction of the euro.The effects for strong euro countries are generally 
lower than the effects for weak euro countries. Among the control group only Denmark shows 
significant increases in debt and equity financing. Denmark is different from all other non-euro 
countries: it is the only non-euro country in our sample that has maintained a tight currency peg 
with respect to the euro. Thus it is not that surprising that Denmark is behaving like an euro 
country.   
 
5.  Financial Development and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities 
 
Our main result in Table II that euro firms have increased their external financing is 
consistent with both an increase in firms’ demand for financing, as well as with an increase in the 
supply of capital, which would allow previously financially constrained firms to raise more 
capital than in the past.  In this section we investigate to what extent the level of domestic  
26 
 
financial development before the euro is related to the increase in external financing. To the 
extent that the existence of different currencies segments capital market due to exchange rate risk 
and transactions costs, it should follow that joining at currency union will lead to less 
segmentation and thus a potentially increased supply of capital. The effect of such an increase in 
the supply should be larger for firms in countries with less developed financial markets, since 
they would be relatively more financially constrained when financial markets are segmented 
(Guiso, Jappelli, Padua, and Pagano (2004)).  
We test the impact of financial development on the financing choices of euro firms in the 
post-euro period by including three complementary measures for the pre-euro level of financial 
development that are each interacted with the euro dummy. The first measure is Pre-Euro 
Private Bond Market Cap/ GDP, defined as the outstanding total value of debt securities divided 
by GDP. This is a measure of the relative development of arms- length debt markets. The second 
measure is Pre-Euro Private Credit/ GDP which is equal to the value of outstanding credit to the 
private sector by financial institutions divided by the GDP. This measure is meant to capture the 
relative activity by financial intermediaries. Finally we include Pre-Euro Stock Market Cap/GDP 
size, which is equal to the aggregate market value of public stocks divided by GDP. This last 
measure is meant to capture the relative development of stock markets. The data on all three 
measures come from the widely used Worldbank Financial Development and Structure Database 
(see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000)). Each of the three measures is calculated as the 
within-country mean over 1991-1997 (see Panel B in Appendix B for summary statistics). We 
have to drop firms from Luxembourg from the analysis because data on private bond market size 
is not available in the database.     
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To accurately estimate the  difference-in-difference effect of the interactions between the 
financial development measures and euro status, we also include each financial development 
measure’s interaction with a dummy variable indicating whether the time period is post the 
introduction of the euro of not. Note that because the pre-euro financial development variables as 
we define them are constant throughout the whole sample period, they are perfectly collinear 
with the firm fixed effects and can therefore not be included by themselves in the regressions. 
Table V presents the estimation results of the interactions between the pre-euro level of 
financial development and the dummy indicating a euro firm in the post-euro time period. 
Column (1) shows that positive effect of euro status on external financing is significantly 
decreasing in the relative pre-euro bond market size.  Thus, firms in euro countries with the least 
developed debt securities markets increase their external finance the most. Looking at debt and 
equity issues in Columns (2) and (3), respectively, we see that the effect is only there for debt 
issues, which is what we would expect. The other two financial development variables have no 
significant impact on the effect of euro status on total external financing or separately on either 
debt or equity issues.  
These results are not too surprising given the observed explosive growth of corporate 
bond markets in the euro area as a whole following the introduction of the euro. Firms in 
countries with previously limited debt securities markets were suddenly part of a larger pan-
European market that was attracting a lot of capital, and our results suggest that this fact helped 
alleviate financial constraints they were facing prior to the euro. One caveat is in order, however. 
It is important to note that the level of financial development is strongly correlated with a 
country’s status as a weak euro country (which is why we do not estimate any specifications with 
the strong and weak euro dummies in Table V).  Thus, although the results are consistent with  
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the adaptation of the euro increasing the supply of capital and thereby reducing financial 
constraints, we cannot rule out that an increased demand for financing is partly responsible for 
the results, since we know from Bris et al (2006, 2009) that weak euro firms experienced the 
largest increases in valuations and investments following the introduction of the euro due to 
removal of devaluation risk and lower cost of capital. In the next section, we will further test the 
supply hypothesis by instead using an exogenous industry-level measure of financial constraints  
 
6.  External Finance Dependence and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities 
 
To further examine if demand for or supply of financing is the main contributing factor 
for the increase in external financing, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and classify 
industries’ level of dependence on  external financing by measuring the fraction of capital 
expenditures  financed by external funds  in corresponding industries in the U.S. between 1991 
and 1997.  Rajan and Zingales argue that because the United States have relatively frictionless 
financial markets, US industries external finance dependence is likely to capture the 
technological demand for external finance. For our purpose, the US industry external dependence 
provides us with an external finance dependence measure that is exogenous to the formation of 
EMU. 
Specifically, we first match our sample industries to corresponding US industries based 
on two digit SEC codes. We then identify all US firms in corresponding industries over the 
1991-1997 time period. For each industry-matched US firm, we calculate the individual fraction 
of capital expenditures financed by external funds as the sum of external financing (= capital 
expenditures minus net cash flow from operating activities) divided by the sum of capital 
expenditures  over 1991-1997. We then calculate the median external finance dependence by  
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industry and use that as the overall measure of an industry’s external finance dependence. Finally 
we classify an industry (and consequently any firm in this industry) as more external finance 
dependent if its industry has a higher external finance dependence than the median industry 
represented in the sample (external finance dependence = 0.211). Remaining industries are 
consequently labeled as less external finance dependent.   
Table VI replicates our main analysis in Table II but splits the sample in two according to 
external finance dependence.  Panel A shows the estimation results for the more external finance 
dependent subsample and Panel B shows the equivalent results for less external finance 
dependent subsample. We see that the effect of the euro on external financing activity is much 
larger in magnitude in more external finance dependent industries. In the more dependent 
sample, firms in the euro area on average increase Net External Finance by a statistically 
significant 5.4 percentage points more than non-euro firms following the introduction of the 
euro. In the less dependent sample, the equivalent increase is just over half in magnitude, 2.8 
percentage points, and only significant at the 10%-level. When we distinguish between strong 
and weak euro firms, we see that weak euro firms in both subsamples increase their external 
financing more following the euro compared to strong euro firms. This is consistent with the 
results in Table II. More interestingly, we also find that the comparatively larger effect of euro 
membership in more external finance dependent industries hold not only for weak euro firms, but 
also for strong euro firms. In both cases, the effect of the euro in the less dependent sample is 
around 50% of the magnitude in the more dependent sample.  
Looking at the results for Net Debt Issues and. Net Equity Issues we see that the 
comparatively larger effect of the euro on total external financing is more due to a larger increase 
in debt issues than a larger increase in equity issues. In the more dependent sample, euro  
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membership increases Net Debt Issues with 3.1 percentage points versus an increase of 1.5 
percentage points in the less dependent sample. For Net Equity Issues the increase is 2.1 
percentage points in the more dependent sample versus 1.9 percentage points in the less 
dependent sample. When we distinguish between strong and weak euro firms, this pattern in 
results is more or less repeated  
The results in Table VI show that the introduction of the  euro membership have mattered 
more for more external finance dependent firms, which is consistent with supply of capital being  
important for financing decisions. We know that the aggregate value of debt securities markets 
and syndicated loan markets in the euro area has increased tremendously after the introduction of 
the euro (see, e.g. Pagano von Thadden (2004), Altunbas et al. (2009)).  If the capital supply 
channel is behind the results in Table VI, it seems reasonable to believe that it is an increase in 
the supply of capital in precisely these debt markets that is the cause.  Although we cannot 
observe where the debt firms raise comes from in our data, we can indirectly test this conjecture 
by analyzing the impact of the euro conditional on firm size. Smaller firms generally have less 
access to debt securities and syndicated loan markets. Thus, we would expect the effect of the 
euro to be greater for larger firms.  
In Table VII, we split the sample between large and small firms and estimate our baseline 
regressions for each subsample. We first rank firms based on average yearly sales in real USD 
over the 1991-1997 time period. Next we designate firms as large if they have higher average 
sales than the sample median, otherwise they are classified as small. Panel A of Table VII 
displays the results for large firms and Panel B does the same for small firms.  Consistent with 
our conjecture, we see that large euro firms have experienced a comparatively greater increase in  
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external financing following the introduction of the euro. Moreover, the difference relative to 
smaller euro firms seems to be due to greater debt financing.   
Finally, in Table VIII, we divide the sample both according to external finance 
dependence and according to firm size.  Hence, we end up with four subsamples. Panel A of 
Table VIII shows the result for large firms in more external finance dependent industries, Panel 
B shows the result for smaller firms in more dependent industries,  Panel C shows the result for 
large firms in less external finance dependent industries, and finally Panel D shows the result for 
smaller firms in less dependent industries. Consistent with an increased supply of debt capital 
being an important factor behind our results,  large euro firms that are dependent on external 
financing have increased external financing significantly more after the euro than other firms. 
The effect is concentrated on debt financing and there are no differences in external equity 
financing. Thus the evidence supports the conjecture that increased supply of credit through the 
bond and syndicated loan markets have enabled large financially dependent firms to raise more 
debt financing. 
 
7.  Foreign Sales Exposure and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities 
 
Bris et al. (2009) show that companies from weak euro-countries that were harmed by 
currency devaluations experienced largest increases in Tobin’s Q. They conclude that 
devaluation risk constituted a significant part of the cost of capital prior to the introduction of the 
euro.  Elimination of devaluation risk would lead to lower cost of capital and increased demand 
for financing. However, devaluation risk could also be a proxy for international financing 
constraints. Firms that would be harmed by devaluations would find it more difficult to offer  
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credible collateral to foreign currency lenders and thus they could be shot out from international 
capital markets. 
In order to measure which companies were harmed by devaluations, Bris et al. (2009) 
estimated exchange rate risk factor where negative currency exposure implied that a company 
would be harmed by a currency devaluation. Since exchange rate risk factor is unstable and hard 
to estimate with precision, we instead use the fraction foreign sales as a proxy for currency risk. 
We measure firms’ foreign sales exposure by the within-firm average fraction of foreign sales 
over total sales during the 1991-1997 pre-euro time period.
5  We then classify firms as having 
low foreign sales if the average fraction foreign sales is at or below the median for the whole 
sample; otherwise the firm is classified as having high foreign sales.  The median fraction 
average pre-euro foreign sales is 32.05%; thus, firms classified as having high foreign sales sell 
an economically meaningful fraction of their output abroad.  
Table IX displays the results of estimating our baseline regression separately for low and 
high foreign sales firms; Panel A presents results for low foreign sales firms and Panel B 
presents results for high foreign sales firms.  We see that euro firms in both groups significantly 
increase their external financing relative to comparable non-euro firms. However, euro firms 
with low foreign sales increase their external financing comparatively more than euro firms with 
high foreign sales. This difference is mainly due to weak euro firms with low foreign sales 
increasing their debt financing with a magnitude that is twice as high as that of weak euro firms 
with high foreign sales. Interestingly, we see that when it comes to equity financing, euro firms 
with high foreign sales increase their equity financing marginally more than euro firms with low 
foreign sales.  
                                                 
5 Foreign sales is calculated as the sum of exports (Worldscope item#07161) and international sales, i.e. sales 
generated by foreign operations (Worldscope item #07101).    
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To the extent that the fraction foreign sales is a proxy for exchange rate exposure, our 
results are consistent with the view that devaluation risk lead to international financial 
constraints,  since  the euro firms increasing their external financing the most are domestically 
oriented firms in weak euro countries (where the devaluation risk is the highest).  Thus this result 
is consistent with our results on external finance dependence. Because firms in the low foreign 
sales group still can have a fairly substantial amount of sales abroad, we test the robustness of 
this result by comparing firms with zero foreign sales to all other firms. Appendix C presents the 
results from this split. As we can see, the result becomes even stronger although the number of 
observations in the zero foreign sales groups is significantly lower. Both weak and strong euro 
firms with zero foreign sales significantly increase debt financing relative to comparable non-
euro firms, but weak euro firms increase debt financing more than strong euro firms in this 
group. More importantly, the euro firms with no foreign sales increase debt at a magnitude that is 
around twice as large as that for corresponding weak and strong euro firms with a least some 
foreign sales.  
To shed light on whether the above results really reflect a capital supply effect rather than 
a firm demand effect, we further split both the low foreign sales group and the high foreign sales 
into two based on firm size, similar to what we did when analyzing the impact of external 
finance dependence. Table X presents the results from the baseline regressions separately for 
each of the four sub-groups. Panels A and B present results for large and small firms with low 
foreign sales, respectively.  Panels C and D present results for large and small firms with high 
foreign sales, respectively.  We see that large euro firms with low foreign sales increase external 
financing the most, whereas small euro firms with high foreign sales increase external financing 
the least. The increase is external financing among large euro firms with low foreign sales is  
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driven by an increase in debt financing by weak euro firms.  Large euro firms with high foreign 
sales do increase their financing significantly (se Panel C), but the increase is smaller in 
magnitude than that of small euro firms with low foreign sales (see Panel B).  For both of these 
two sub-groups, equity financing contributes relatively more to the overall increase in external 
financing among euro firms compared to the group of large firms with  low foreign sales. 
Because we argue large firms benefit relatively more from an increased supply of arms-length 
debt capital, we view the results in Table X as further evidence on the importance of the supply 
of capital for firms’ external financing activities. 
 
8.  The Effect of the Euro on Asset Growth and Dividends  
 
So far we have documented a significant increase in external financing among euro firms 
following the introduction of the euro, in particular among firms from countries that suffered 
devaluations during the ERM crisis (i.e. the weak euro countries). In this section we analyze 
what these new funds have been used for.  In principal, new external funds would have to be 
used for asset growth or to increase the payout to shareholders.  Given the magnitude of the 
increase in financing, it is reasonable to expect that most of the funds have been used for asset 
growth. However, the type of asset growth should be able to tell us more about why the euro has 
facilitated an increase in external financing. If the euro has permanently increased the supply of 
capital and lowered the cost of capital we would expect firms to mainly use any new funds raised 
to invest in productive assets. However, to the extent that firms believe the “euro effect” is 
temporary, we would expect firms to take the opportunity to increase their cash holdings to save 
for the future when financing conditions are expected to return to normal.  
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In Table XI we analyze to what extent the documented increase in external financing due 
to the euro is connected to asset growth versus an increase in dividends, and also whether we see 
a growth in non-cash assets versus cash holdings. To capture asset growth we use the variable   
Change in Assets, defined as the change in the total book value of assets during the year divided 
by the beginning-of-year book value of assets. This variable is thus the regular growth rate in 
total assets. Growth in non-cash assets is captured by the variable Change in Non-Cash Assets, 
defined as the change in non-cash assets (=total assets minus cash and short-term investments)   
over the year divided by the beginning-of-year book value of assets. The growth rate in non-cash 
assets is thus expressed as a fraction of all assets. Similarly the growth in cash holdings is 
measured by Change in Cash Holdings, defined as   the change in cash and short-term 
investments over the year divided by the beginning-of-year book value of assets. Finally we 
measure dividends as dividends paid over the year divided by the beginning-of-year book value 
of assets.   All four of these dependent variables are winsorized at their 1
st and 99
th percentile 
values.  In each regression of Table XI we included the same set of independent variables used in 
the external financing regressions (see Table II) .  
Panel A of Table XI presents the regression results for the full sample of firms. Not 
surprisingly, we see that the increase in external financing is mirrored by a similar significant 
increase in total assets. The euro does not seem to have any effect on dividends paid by firms. 
Moreover, we see that the whole increase in total assets is due to a significant increase in non-
cash assets; there is no significant effect on cash holdings. This result suggests that firms expect 
the positive effects of the euro to be permanent.  The results in Panel A are consistent an increase 
in the supply of capital, but also with firms reacting to an increase in investment opportunities 
(demand effect).  We know from Table VI that euro  firms in more external finance dependent  
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industries increased their external financing comparatively more, which support that an increase 
if the supply of capital is an important driver of the overall results. In Panels B and C of Table XI 
we similarly split the firms depending on external finance dependence to check that the external 
financing results also carry over to asset growth.  Panel B presents the results for more external 
finance dependent industries, and Panel C presents results for less external finance dependent 
industries.  Not surprisingly, we do get similar results. It is euro firms, in particular weak euro 
firms that have increased non-cash assets the most following the introduction of the euro. In 
Panel D we split the post-euro time to early (1999-2002) and late (2003-2006) time periods. 
Consistent with the financing results, firms have increased their non-cash assets more during the 
latter period. 
.   
9.  Conclusions 
 
We provide evidence that the introduction of the euro has led to an increase in external 
financing, especially an increase in debt financing, among euro-countries. Results are stronger 
for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies and for firms that have the lowest 
foreign sales.  Although these results are consistent with an increased demand for financing 
among euro firms, it can also be argued that history of devaluations or low foreign sales are also 
proxies for international financial constraints. Eliminating currency risks thus could lead to 
increased availability of financing. 
We also find more direct evidence that increased supply has been a major contributing 
factor in explaining increased use of external financing. Firms that were likely to be financially 
constrained prior to the introduction of the euro should experience the largest increases in 
external financing. Supporting this hypothesis, we find that firms in euro countries that had less  
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developed bond markets before the euro have increased their external financing more; and that 
firms in industries that are more dependent on external financing have increased their debt 
financing more.  Further supporting the hypothesis that increased supply has been a major factor 
in increasing the use of external financing, we find that large firms, who supposedly have better 
access to syndicated loans and bond markets, have increased their debt financing more. In 
particular, the effects are the strongest for large firms in industries that are more external finance 
dependent.  
To the extent that increased availability of external financing leads to more investments, 
firms in the euro-area should grow faster than firms is other European countries. Our paper 
provides an explanation why the euro was deemed to be a disappointment at first: it took several 
years after the introduction of the euro to build infrastructure that could support increased 
financing and investment. After 2002 the euro finally started to produce tangible benefits. It 
remains to be seen if firms are better able to weather the current crisis inside the euro area or if it 





Altunbas, Yener, Kara Alper, and David Marques-Ibanez (2009), “Large Debt Financing: 
Syndicated Loans versus Corporate Bonds”, European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1028. 
 
Baele, Lieven, Annalisa Ferrando, Peter Hördahl, Elizaveta Krylova, and Cyril Monnet (2004), 
“Measuring European Financial Integration”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20: 509-530. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2000), "A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure", World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605. 
 
Beetsma, Roel, and Massimo Giuliodori (2010), “The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the 
EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research”, Journal of Economic 
Literature 48, 603-641. 
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey, Christian T. Lundblad, and Stephan Siegel (2010), “The 
European Union, the Euro, and Equity Market Integration”, working paper. 
 
Bris, Arturo, Yrjo Koskinen, and Mattias Nilsson (2006), “The Real Effects of the Euro: 
Evidence from Corporate Investments”, Review of Finance 10 (1), 1-37. 
 
Bris, Arturo, Yrjo Koskinen, and Mattias Nilsson (2009), “The Euro and Corporate Valuations”, 
Review of Financial Studies 22:8, 3171-3209. 
 
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2001), “International and Domestic Collateral 
Constraints in a Model of Emerging Market Crisis”, Journal of Monetary Economics 48, 513-
548. 
 
Cappiello, Lorenzo, Arjan Kadareja, and Simone Manganelli (2008), “The Impact of the Euro on 
Equity Markets: A Country and Sector Decomposition”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, forthcoming.  
 
Coeurdacier, Nicloas and Philippe Martin (2008), “The Geography of Asset Trade and the Euro: 
Insiders and Outsiders”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, forthcoming. 
De Santis, Roberto A. and Bruno Gerard (2006), “Financial Integration, International Portfolio 
Choice and the European Monetary Union”, European Central Bank Working Paper No. 626. 
 
Faulkender, Michael and Mitchell Petersen, 2006, “Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital 
Structure?”,  Review of Financial Studies 19 (1), 45-79. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Tullio Jappelli, Mario Padula, and Marco Pagano (2004), “Financial Market 
Integration and Economic Growth in the EU”, Economic Policy 40. 
 
Hale, Galina and Mark M. Spiegel (2009), “Who Drove the Boom in Euro-Dominated Bond 




Hardouvelis, Gikas A., Dimitrios Malliaropulos, and Richard Priestley (2006), “EMU and 
European Stock Market Integration”, Journal of Business 79 (1), 365–392. 
 
Hardouvelis, Gikas A., Dimitrios Malliaropulos, and Richard Priestley (2007), “The Impact of 
EMU on the Equity Cost of Capital”, Journal of International Money and Finance 26, 305-327. 
 
Hasan, Tarek A. (2010), “Country Size, Currency Unions, and International Asset Returns”, 
working paper. 
  
Japelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano (2008), “Financial Market Integration under EMU”, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 791. 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose-Luis Peydro (2010), “What Lies Beneath 
the Euro’s Effect on Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, 
working paper no. 1216, European Central Bank. 
   
Lane, Philip R. (2006), “Global Bond Portfolios and EMU”, International Journal of Central 
Banking 2, 1-23. 
 
Lane, Philip R. (2008), “EMU and Financial Integration”, IIIS Discussion Paper No. 272. 
 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007), “The International Equity Holdings of 
Euro Area Investors”, in The Importance of the External Dimension for the Euro Area: Trade, 
Capital Flows, and International Macroeconomic Linkages, Robert Anderton and Filippo di 
Mauro, eds., Cambridge University Press. 
 
Leary, Mark T. (2009), “Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure”, 
Journal of Finance 64 (3), 1143-1185. 
 
Lemmon, Michael and Michael Roberts (2010), “The Response of Corporate Financing and 
Investment to Changes in the Supply of Credit”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
forthcoming. 
 
Pagano, Marco and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (2004), “The European Bond Markets under 
EMU,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20 (4), 531-554. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales (1995), “What Do We Know About Capital Structure? 
Some Evidence from International Data,” Journal of Finance 50, 1421-1460.  
 
Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales (1998), “Financial Dependence and Growth,” 
American Economic Review 88 (3), 559-587. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales (2003), “Banks and Markets: The Changing Character 
of European Finance,” European Central Bank 2




Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales (2003), “Banks and Markets. The Changing Character 
of European Finance,” in The Transformation of the European Financial System, Vítor 
Gaspar, Philipp Hartmann and Olaf Sleijpen, eds., European Central Bank. 
 
Stulz, René (1999), “Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital,” Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 12 (3), Fall, 8-25. 
 
Sufi, Amir (2009), “The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of 
Bank Loan Ratings”, Review of Financial Studies 22 (4), 1659-1691. 
  
41 
Panel A: Outstanding stock of domestic debt securities issued by non-financial corporations  in billions of US dollar 
 
Panel B: Indexed values of outstanding stock of domestic debt securities issued by non-financial corporations (1998 
=100)  
 
Figure 1.  The figure shows the evolution of the outstanding stock (face value) of domestic debt securities issued by 
non-financial corporations over 1991-2006 for euro countries and non-euro countries, respectively.  Panel A shows 
the amounts outstanding and Panel B show indexed values with 1998=100. The data is from Bank of International 
Settlements. The stocks of securities are measured in nominal USD.  
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Panel A: Outstanding stock of international debt securities issued by non-financial corporations in billions of US 
dollar 
 
Panel B: Indexed values of outstanding stock of international debt securities issued by financial institutions 
(1998=100)) 
   
Figure 2.  The figure shows the evolution of the outstanding stock (face value) of international debt securities issued 
by non-financial corporations over 1993-2006.  Panel A shows the amounts outstanding and Panel B show indexed 
values with 1998=100. The data is from Bank of International Settlements. The stocks of securities are measured in 






Panel A: Outstanding stock of international  syndicated credit facilities  in billions of US dollar 
 
Panel B: Indexed values of outstanding stock of international  syndicated credit facilities  (1998=100)  
 
Figure 3.  The figure shows the evolution of signed international syndicated credit facilities (both corporate and 
financial borrowers) over 1991-2006 for euro countries and non-euro countries, respectively.  Panel A shows the 
amounts outstanding and Panel B show indexed values with 1998=100. The data is from Bank of International 
Settlements. The credit facilities are measured in nominal USD.  
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Table I. Financing activity before and after the introduction of the euro  
The sample is an unbalanced  panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain)  and five Non-euro countries 
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006.  The post-euro time period is 
defined as the years 1999-2006. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Net External Finance 
    Average Net External Finance  
 
 





(Post-euro – Pre-euro) 
 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries   1,348  0.075  0.079  0.005  0.85 
Strong euro countries  967  0.077  0.068  -0.009  1.53 
Weak euro countries  381  0.067  0.108  0.041  3.37*** 
Non-euro countries  1,138  0.128  0.073  -0.055  8.17*** 
T-test of difference:                          
Euro vs. non-euro countries                 7.19***  0.91  6.83*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries    6.53***  0.73  5.00*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries     5.74***  3.55***  6.91*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries     1.04  4.20***  3.70** 
Panel B: Net Debt Issues 
    Average Net Debt Issues  
 
 






 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries   1,348  0.053  0.057  0.003  0.82 
Strong euro countries  967  0.057  0.048  -0.008  1.72* 
Weak euro countries  381  0.045  0.078  0.033  3.92*** 
Non-euro countries  1,138  0.080  0.051  -0.029  6.09*** 
T-test of difference:                          
Euro vs. non-euro countries                 5.31***  1.28  5.08*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries    4.37***  0.77  3.03*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries     4.94***  3.95***  6.39*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries     1.73*  4.22***  4.26*** 
Panel C: Net Equity Issues 
    Average Net Equity Issues  
 
 






 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries   1,348  0.018  0.021  0.003  1.60 
Strong euro countries  967  0.018  0.019  0.002  0.82 
Weak euro countries  381  0.019  0.026  0.007  1.51 
Non-euro countries  1,138  0.042  0.019  -0.023  8.46*** 
T-test of difference:                          
Euro vs. non-euro countries                 8.19***  0.73  7.87*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries    8.24***  0.49  7.31*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries     5.28***  1.83*  5.78*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries     0.48  2.00**  1.03**  
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Table II.  The Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are 
reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.040**   0.021*    0.020***   
  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)    0.024*   0.009   0.018*** 
   [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.077***  0.051***  0.026*** 
   [0.019]  [0.014]  [0.006] 
U.S.  Industry  Q  0.080*** 0.080*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] 
Log(Sales) -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.029*** -0.030***
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.004]  [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] 
EBITDA/Assets  0.534*** 0.533*** 0.403*** 0.402***  0.119  0.118 
 [0.085]  [0.084]  [0.025]  [0.025] [0.076] [0.076] 
Collateral/Assets 0.001  -0.001  -0.009  -0.011  0.007  0.006 
 [0.025]  [0.026]  [0.016]  [0.016] [0.011] [0.011] 
I(Leverage>90%) -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.097*** -0.098***  0.020**  0.020** 
 [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.017] [0.008] [0.008] 
GDP  Growth  1.324*** 1.248*** 1.188*** 1.128***  0.125*  0.112 
 [0.249]  [0.226]  [0.201]  [0.185] [0.071] [0.072] 
Term Spread  -0.008**  -0.008**  -0.006** -0.006**  -0.002  -0.002 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Change in USD Exchange Rate  -0.234*** -0.249*** -0.225*** -0.237*** -0.019  -0.022 
 [0.063]  [0.067]  [0.052]  [0.056] [0.022] [0.022] 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  29,332 29,332 29,332 29,332 29,332 29,332 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table IV. The Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities : Individual country results  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006.  Note that firms from United Kingdom constitute the benchmark sample in this table. The same set 
of control variables as in Table II are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available 
from the authors upon request. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the 
country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: 
 
Net External 
Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues
Explanatory variable:  (1)  (3)  (5) 
I(Austria) x I(Post-Euro) 0.012**  -0.006*  0.022*** 
  [0.005] [0.003] [0.002] 
I(Belgium) x I(Post-Euro)  0.018*** 0.001 0.025*** 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] 
I(Finland) x I(Post-Euro)  0.057*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 
  [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] 
I(France) x I(Post-Euro)  0.043*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] 
I(Germany) x I(Post-Euro) 0.012*  -0.000  0.015*** 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
I(Ireland) x I(Post-Euro) 0.008  0.010**  -0.002 
  [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] 
I(Italy) x I(Post-Euro)  0.089*** 0.058*** 0.037*** 
  [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] 
I(Luxembourg) x I(Post-Euro)  0.110*** 0.061*** 0.035*** 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] 
I(Netherlands) x I(Post-Euro)  0.063*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
I(Portugal) x I(Post-Euro)  0.061*** 0.038*** 0.019*** 
  [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] 
I(Spain) x I(Post-Euro)  0.139*** 0.097*** 0.037*** 
  [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] 
I(Denmark) x I(Post-Euro)  0.066*** 0.048*** 0.015*** 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] 
I(Norway) x I(Post-Euro) 0.006  -0.002  0.009** 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] 
I(Sweden x I(Post-Euro) -0.017***  0.002  -0.018*** 
  [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] 
I(Switzerland) x I(Post-Euro) -0.003  -0.006  0.003 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] 
Control Variables, Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.24 0.22 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  29,332  29,332  29,332 







Table V.  Pre-Euro Financial Development and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from ten Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2006. 
The same set of control variables as in Table II are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full 
results are available from the authors upon request. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 








Explanatory variable:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.096*  0.070**  0.027 
 [0.050]  [0.032]  [0.022] 
I(Euro Country) x Pre-Euro Priv. Bond Market Size/GDP x I(Post-Euro) -0.155** -0.118**  -0.028 
 [0.070]  [0.053]  [0.019] 
Pre-Euro Private Bond Market Size/GDP  x I(Post-Euro) 0.046**  0.037***  0.008 
 [0.017]  [0.007]  [0.012] 
I(Euro Country) x Pre-Euro Stock Market Cap/GDP x I(Post-Euro) 0.064  0.065  -0.004 
 [0.084]  [0.060]  [0.029] 
Pre-Euro Stock Market Cap/GDP x I(Post-Euro) 0.027  0.016***  0.009 
  [0.022] [0.005]  [0.018] 
I(Euro Country) x Pre-Euro Private Credit/GDP x I(Post-Euro) -0.015  -0.026  0.009 
 [0.057]  [0.039]  [0.024] 
Pre-Euro Private Credit/GDP x I(Post-Euro) -0.062***  -0.042***  -0.016 
 [0.019]  [0.005]  [0.015] 
Control Variables  YES YES  YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.24  0.22 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  29,858  29,858  29,858 
Number of Firms  2,480  2,480  2,480  
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Table VI.  External Finance Dependence and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. Panel A presents results for firm in more external finance dependent industries, and Panel B 
presents results for firms in less external finance dependent industries. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
external finance dependence is defined as the average fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal 
funds for U.S. firms in the same industry during 1991-1997.  An industry (and consequently any firm in this 
industry) is then classified as more external finance dependent if its industry has a higher external finance 
dependence than the median industry represented in the sample.  The same set of control variables as in Table II are 
included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available from the authors upon request. See 
Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. 
* and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively 
 
Panel A: More External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.054***   0.031*   0.021***  
  [0.018]  [0.015]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.034**   0.015    0.017*** 
   [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.107***  0.073***  0.032*** 
   [0.027]  [0.018]  [0.008] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.28 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations  14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 
Number  of  Firms  1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 
 
Panel B: Less External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.028*    0.015    0.019***   
  [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.005]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.016  0.005   0.018*** 
   [0.013]  [0.009]  [0.005] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.056***  0.037***  0.021*** 
   [0.016]  [0.012]  [0.006] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations  15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 
Number  of  Firms  1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254  
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Table VII.  Firm Size and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the years 
1999-2006. Firms are classified into large and small firms based on the following: (i) First we calculate each 
individual firm’s average sales in inflation-adjusted USD in the time period 1991-1997. (ii) Second, we classify a 
firm as large if this average is above the corresponding median for all sample firms; otherwise it is classified as 
small. Panel A presents results for large firms and Panel B present results for small firms. The same set of control 
variables as in Table II are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates 
significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Large firms  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.052***   0.031**   0.021***  
  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.037***   0.017*   0.021*** 
   [0.012]  [0.009]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.087***  0.064***  0.022*** 
   [0.020]  [0.015]  [0.005] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations  15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 
Number  of  Firms  1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 
 
Panel B: Small firms  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.030    0.014    0.019***   
  [0.018]  [0.013]  [0.006]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.014  0.004   0.013*** 
   [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.071***   0.041**   0.032*** 
   [0.024]  [0.015]  [0.010] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.26 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations  14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 
Number  of  Firms  1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 
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Table VIII.  Firm Size, External Finance Dependence and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. Firms are classified into large and small firms based on the following: (i) First we calculate each 
individual firm’s average sales in inflation-adjusted USD in the time period 1991-1997. (ii) Second, we classify a 
firm as large if this average is above the corresponding median for all sample firms; otherwise it is classified as 
small. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), external finance dependence is defined as the average fraction of 
capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry during 1991-1997.  An 
industry (and consequently any firm in this industry) is then classified as more external finance dependent if its 
industry has a higher external finance dependence than the median industry represented in the sample. The results 
for large firms conditional on their external finance dependence are presented in Panels A and C.  The results for 
small firms conditional on their external finance dependence are presented in Panels B and D. The same set of 
control variables as in Table II are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available 
from the authors upon request. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the 
country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively 
 
Panel A: Large Firms in More External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.074***  0.048***  0.022***  
  [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.056***   0.032**   0.021*** 
   [0.015]  [0.011]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.124***  0.095***  0.026*** 
   [0.028]  [0.021]  [0.007] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.32 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.22 0.22 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  7,284 7,284 7,284 7,284 7,284 7,284 
Number  of  Firms  573 573 573 573 573 573 
 
Panel B: Small Firms in More External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.037*    0.017   0.019**  
  [0.020]  [0.016]  [0.007]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.015  0.001   0.012* 
   [0.019]  [0.016]  [0.006] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.092**  0.056**  0.037** 
   [0.037]  [0.022]  [0.015] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  7,290 7,290 7,290 7,290 7,290 7,290 





Panel C: Large Firms in Less External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.034**    0.017    0.020***   
  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.005]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.021  0.004   0.020*** 
   [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.006] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.062***   0.044**   0.018*** 
   [0.019]  [0.016]  [0.005] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.28 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.19 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  8,498 8,498 8,498 8,498 8,498 8,498 
Number  of  Firms  670 670 670 670 670 670 
 
Panel D: Small Firms in Less External Finance Dependent Industries  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.027    0.014   0.018**  
  [0.020]  [0.013]  [0.006]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.016  0.008   0.015** 
   [0.019]  [0.013]  [0.006] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.054**  0.030**   0.027*** 
   [0.021]  [0.013]  [0.008] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Number  of  Firm-Year  Observations  6,599 6,599 6,599 6,599 6,599 6,599 
















Table IX.  Foreign Sales and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. We split firms into two groups depending on their pre-euro level of foreign sales. Panel A reports 
results for firms with low pre-euro fraction foreign sales, defined as firms whose average fraction foreign sales over 
1991-1997 is ≤  the median for all sample firms. Panel B reports results for firms with low pre-euro fraction foreign 
sales, defined as firms whose average fraction foreign sales over 1991-1997 is > the median for all sample firms. 
The same set of control variables as in Table II are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * 
and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms with Low Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales  
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.050**  0.035**   0.015***   
  [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.031*   0.021    0.011** 
   [0.016]  [0.012]  [0.005] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.095***  0.069***  0.024*** 
   [0.021]  [0.017]  [0.007] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  12,786 12,786 12,786 12,786 12,786 12,786 
Number  of  Firms  1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 
 
Panel B: Firms with High Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.031*    0.014    0.019***   
  [0.015]  [0.011]  [0.005]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.025  0.007   0.020*** 
   [0.015]  [0.011]  [0.005] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.047**   0.033***    0.018* 
   [0.020]  [0.011]  [0.008] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  13,207 13,207 13,207 13,207 13,207 13,207 
Number  of  Firms  1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 
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Table X.  Firm Size, Foreign Sales, and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. Firms are classified into large and small firms based on the following: (i) First we calculate each 
individual firm’s average sales in inflation-adjusted USD in the time period 1991-1997. (ii) Second, we classify a 
firm as large if this average is above the corresponding median for all sample firms; otherwise it is classified as 
small. We also split firms into two groups depending on their pre-euro level of foreign sales: Firms with low pre-
euro fraction foreign sales are defined as firms whose average fraction foreign sales over 1991-1997 is ≤  the median 
for all sample firms, otherwise it is classified as having high foreign sales. The results for large firms conditional on 
level of foreign sales are presented in Panels A and C, The results for small firms conditional on their level of 
foreign sales are presented in Panels B and D. The same set of control variables as in Table II are included but not 
explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available from the authors upon request. See Appendix A for 
other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, 
indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively 
 
Panel A: Large Firms with Low Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.057**  0.040**  0.016**  
  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.006]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.033  0.018   0.016* 
   [0.019]  [0.012]  [0.008] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.106***  0.086***  0.017*** 
   [0.028]  [0.021]  [0.005] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.29 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.23 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 
Number  of  Firms  444 444 444 444 444 444 
 
Panel B: Small Firms with Low Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.046**    0.033*    0.015***   
  [0.018]  [0.017]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.031  0.025  0.008 
   [0.020]  [0.019]  [0.005] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)      0.088***   0.054**  0.036** 
   [0.029]  [0.020]  [0.013] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226 





Panel C: Large Firms with High Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.044***   0.024**   0.020***  
  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)    0.038***   0.018   0.019*** 
   [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.061***   0.041**   0.022*** 
   [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.005] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.18 
Number  of    Firm-Year  Observations  8,868 8,868 8,868 8,868 8,868 8,868 
Number  of  Firms  678 678 678 678 678 678 
 
Panel D: Small Firms with High Pre-Euro Fraction Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.009  0.001  0.014  
  [0.023]  [0.013]  [0.009]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.003   -0.009  0.017** 
   [0.021]  [0.013]  [0.007] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.025  0.029  0.006 
   [0.045]  [0.020]  [0.021] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Number  of  Firm-Year  Observations  4,339 4,339 4,339 4,339 4,339 4,339 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A. Variable definitions   
 
Variable  Definition (item # refers to Worldscope field) 
Net Debt Issues  [Total liabilitiest (item #03351) – total liabilititest-1] ÷ total assetst-1 (item# 02999).   
Net Equity Issues  Depending on data availability this variable is calculated as either:  
(i) [proceeds from common and preferred stock issues (item #04251)  – purchases and 
retirements of common and preferred shares (item #04751) ] ÷ total assetst-1 (item# 02999). 
or (ii) [book value of common equityt (item #03501) + preferred stockt (item #03451)- 
retained earningst (item #03495)  - (book value of common equityt-1  + preferred stockt-1 - 
retained earningst-1)] ÷ total assetst-1.   
Net External Finance  The sum of net debt and equity issues as defined above.  
I(Euro Country)it  Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, or Spain; zero otherwise 
I(Strong Euro Country)  Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,  
Luxembourg, or the Netherlands, Portugal; zero otherwise 
I(Weak Euro Country)  Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Finland, Ireland, Italy, , Portugal, or Spain; 
zero otherwise  
I(Post Euro)  Indicator  variable =1 if the time period is 1999-2006; zero otherwise 
US industry Q  The median US firm Q in each two-digit SIC code industry, calculated using all US firms 
with available data on Tobin’s Q in Compustat. Tobin’s Q is calculated as [the book value 
of assets – the book value of equity + market value of equity] ÷ book value of total assets. 
This variable is lagged one year. 
Log (Sales)  The natural logarithm of net sales (item # 01001) expressed in real USD (baseline year = 
2000). This variable is lagged one year and Winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile. 
EBITDA/assets  Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation and amortization (item #18198 or, 
alternatively, item #18191 + item #01151)  ÷ total assets (item #02999). This variable is 
lagged one year and Winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile. 
Collateral/assets  [Net property, plant, and equipment (item #02501) + inventories (item #02101)]÷ book 




Leverage  Total liabilities (item #03351) ÷ Total assets (item #02999). This variable is lagged one 
year. 
I(Leverage>90%)  Indicator variable =1 if leverage >90%; zero otherwise. This variable is lagged one year. 
GDP Growth   Individual country real GDP growth (in USD terms). This variable is lagged one year. 
Term spread   Difference in yields between 10 year government bond and 6 month treasury bill for each 
individual sample country. This variable is lagged one year. 
Change in USD Exchange Rate  [Domestic currency/USD end-of-year exchange rate in year  t - domestic currency/USD 
end-of-year exchange rate in year t-1] ÷  domestic currency/USD end-of-year exchange 
rate in year t-1. 
Pre-Euro Private Bond Market Cap/GDP  Outstanding value of domestic private debt securities ÷ GDP. The variable is the average 
value over 1991-1997 for each sample country.
a 
Pre-Euro Stock Market Cap/GDP   Stock market capitalization ÷ GDP. The variable is the average value over 1991-1997 for 
each sample country.
 a 
Pre-Euro Private Credit/GDP  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions÷ GDP. The variable 
is the average value over 1991-1997 for each sample country. 
a 
Change in Total Assets  [Total assetst (item #02999) - total assetst-1 ]÷ total assetst-1.   
Change in Cash Holdings  [Cash and short term investmentst (item #02001) - cash and short term investmentst ] ÷ 
total assetst-1 (item# 02999).   
Change in Non-Cash Assets  Change in Total Assets - Change in Cash Holdings 
Dividends/ Lagged Assets  Dividends paidt  (item #04551) ÷ total assetst-1 (item# 02999).   
a Source: Worldbank  (see Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000), "A New Database on  Financial Development 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C.  Foreign Sales and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities: Purely Domestic Firms vs. 
Others   
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro-countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) over the time period 1991-2006. The post-euro time period is defined as the 
years 1999-2006. We split firms into two groups depending on their pre-euro level of foreign sales. Panel A reports 
results for purely domestic firms, defined as firms whose average fraction foreign sales over 1991-1997 is zero. 
Panel B reports results for firms with at least some pre-euro foreign sales, defined as firms whose average fraction 
foreign sales over 1991-1997 is >  zero.. The same set of control variables as in Table II are included but not 
explicitly reported to conserve space. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the 
country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Purely Domestic Firms 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.072**  0.060**   0.010   
  [0.026]  [0.021]  [0.007]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.059**  0.050**   0.008 
   [0.026]  [0.021]  [0.006] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.098***  0.082***   0.015 
   [0.029]  [0.024]  [0.017] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 
Number  of  Firm-Year  Observations  3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 
Number  of  Firms  305 305 305 305 305 305 
 
Panel B: Firms with at least Some Foreign Sales 
  Dependent variable: 
  Net External Finance  Net Debt Issues  Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory  variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.038**    0.020    0.020***   
  [0.016]  [0.012]  [0.004]  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.026  0.009   0.019*** 
   [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.004] 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)     0.069***  0.048***  0.024*** 
   [0.018]  [0.012]  [0.006] 
Control  Variables,  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2   0.27 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 
Number of Firm-Year Observations  22,235 22,235 22,235 22,235 22,235 22,235 
Number  of  Firms  1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777  
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